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Abstract
In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any
guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a result, sev-
eral relaxations havebeen introduced, most ofwhich in quite recentworks. We focus on four such
notions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), max-
imin share fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). Since obtaining these
relaxations also turns out to be problematic in several scenarios, approximate versions of them
have been considered. In this work, we investigate further the connections between the four
notions mentioned above and their approximate versions. We establish several tight, or almost
tight, results concerning the approximation quality that any of these notions guarantees for the
others, providing an almost complete picture of this landscape. Some of our findings reveal in-
teresting and surprising consequences regarding the power of these notions, e.g., PMMS and EFX
provide the same worst-case guarantee for MMS, despite PMMS being a strictly stronger notion
than EFX. We believe such implications provide further insight on the quality of approximately
fair solutions.
1 Introduction
In this work, we revisit fairness notions for allocating indivisible goods. The objective in fair division
is to allocate a set of resources to a set of agents in a way that leaves everyone satisfied, according to
their own preferences. Over the years, the field has grown along various directions, with a substantial
literature by now andwith several applications. We refer the reader to the surveys [6, 21, 17] for more
recent results, and to the classic textbooks [8, 22, 19] for an overview of the area.
To model such allocation problems, one needs to specify the preferences of the agents, and the
fairness criterion under consideration. For the preferences, we stick to the usual assumption of asso-
ciating each agent with an additive valuation function on the set of resources. As for fairness criteria,
one of the classic desirable notions that have been proposed is envy-freeness, meaning that no agent
has a higher value for the bundle of another agent than for her own [11, 24]. Unfortunately, for prob-
lems with indivisible goods, this turns out to be a very strong requirement. Existence of envy-free
allocations cannot be guaranteed, and the relevant algorithmic and approximability questions are
also computationally hard [16].
Given these concerns, recent works have considered relaxations of envy-freeness that seemmore
appropriate for settings with indivisible items, see, e.g., [9, 10]. Our work focuses on four such no-
tions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share
fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). All these capture different ways of al-
lowing envy in an allocation, albeit in a restricted way. For instance, EF1 requires that no agent envies
another agent’s bundle after removing from it her most valued item.
These relaxations are still no panacea, especially since existence results have either been elusive
or simply negative. So far, we only know that EF1 allocations always exist, whereas this is not true for
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MMS allocations. As a result, this has naturally led to approximate versions of these notions, accom-
panied by some positive algorithmic results (see related work). What has not been well charted yet,
however, is the relation between these four notions and their approximate counterparts, especially
concerning the approximation quality that any of these notions guarantees for the others. For exam-
ple, does anMMS or an approximate MMS allocation (for which we do know efficient algorithms) pro-
vide an approximation guarantee in terms of the EFX or the PMMS criteria? As it turns out (Prop. 4.5,
Cor. 4.9), it does not. As another example, while we know that PMMS implies EFX, it is not clear if an
approximate PMMS allocation is also approximately EFX. In fact (Prop. 3.7 and 4.8), it is the other way
around! Such results can be conceptually helpful, as they deepen our understanding of the similari-
ties and differences between fairness criteria. Furthermore, this insight allows us to either translate
an approximation algorithm for one notion into an approximation algorithm for another, or to es-
tablish that such an approach cannot yield approximability or existential results. Given the growing
interest in these relaxations, we find it important to further explore these interconnections.
Contribution.We investigate how the four notionsmentioned above and their approximate versions
are related. For each one of them, we examine the approximation guarantee that it provides in terms
of the other three notions. Our results provide an almost complete mapping of the landscape, and
in most cases our approximation guarantees are tight. Some of our results provide interesting and
surprising consequences. Indicatively, some highlights of our results include:
– PMMS and EFX allocations both provide the same constant approximation with respect to the
MMS criterion.
– Although PMMS implies EFX, an approximate PMMS allocationmay be arbitrarily bad in terms of
approximate EFX. On the contrary, an approximate EFX allocationdoesprovide someguarantee
with respect to PMMS.
– While EFX is a much stronger concept than EF1, they both provide comparable constant ap-
proximations for the PMMS criterion and this degrades smoothly for approximate EFX and EF1
allocations.
– Although exact PMMS and MMS are defined in a similar manner, the former implies EFX, EF1,
and a 4/7-approximation in terms of MMS, while the latter provides no guarantee with respect
to the other notions.
– Our results also suggest a simple efficient algorithm for computing a 1/2-approximate PMMS
allocation (the current best to our knowledge),1 and improvements in certain special cases.
Some of the implications between the different notions are depicted in Figure 1.
Related Work. Regarding the several relaxations of envy-freeness, the notion of EF1 originates in
the work of Lipton et al. [16], where both existence and algorithmic results are provided. The con-
cept of MMS was introduced by Budish [9], building on concepts of Moulin [18], and later defined as
considered here by Bouveret and Lemaître [7], who studied a hierarchy of exact fairness concepts.
Kurokawa, Procaccia and Wang [15, 14] showed that MMS allocations do not always exist even for
three agents. From the computational point of view, 2/3-approximation algorithms for MMS alloca-
tions are known [15, 2, 4] and recently this approximation factor has been improved to 3/4 by Ghodsi
et al. [13] who also study non-additive valuation functions. Some variants of the maximin share cri-
terion have also been considered for groups of agents [23]. As for the notions of EFX and PMMS,
they were introduced in the work of Caragiannis et al. [10] which provided some initial results on
how these are related to each other as well as to MMS and to EF1. In particular, they established that a
PMMS allocation is also an EFX, EF1 and 12-MMS allocation. BarmanandKrishnamurty [4] showed that
when the agents agree on the ordering of the items according to their value, then EFX allocations do
1Independently, the recent work of Barman et al. [3], which concerns a stronger concept, also implies an efficient algo-
rithm for computing 1/2-PMMS allocations.
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Figure 1: An indicative chart of implications with envy-freeness as a starting point. All implications shown are
tight or almost tight.
exist and a specific EFX allocation can be produced that is also a 23 -MMS allocation. The existence and
computation of exact and approximate EFX allocations under additive and general valuations was
studied by Plaut and Roughgarden [20], establishing the currently best 1/2-approximation. Finally,
in a recent work, Barman et al. [3] introduce two new fairness notions that are strongly related to the
notions studied here. In particular, they introduce groupwise maximin share fairness (GMMS), which
is a strengthening of PMMS, and envy-freeness up to one less-preferred good (EFL), which is stronger
than EF1 but weaker than EFX. They show that EFL allocations and 12-GMMS allocations always exist
and can be found in polynomial time. Studying how the approximate versions of GMMS and EFL fit
into the landscape explored here is an interesting direction for future work.
2 Preliminaries
We assume we have a set of n agents, N = {1,2, . . . ,n} and a set M of m indivisible goods. Following
the usual assumptions in the majority of the fair division literature, each agent is associated with a
monotone, additive valuation function. Hence, for every S ⊆M , vi (S)=
∑
g∈S vi ({g }). For simplicity,
we will use vi (g ) instead of vi ({g }) for g ∈ M . Monotonicity here implies that vi (g ) ≥ 0 for every
i ∈N ,g ∈M .
We are interested in solutions that allocate the whole set of goods M to the agents. An allocation
of M to the n agents is therefore a partition, A = (A1, . . . ,An), where Ai ∩ A j = ; and
⋃
i Ai =M . By
Πn(M ) we denote the set of all partitions of a setM into n bundles.
2.1 Fairness Concepts
Our work focuses on relaxations of the classic notion of envy-freeness, initially suggested by Gamow
and Stern [12], andmore formally by Foley [11] and Varian [24].
Definition 2.1. An allocationA = (A1, . . . ,An) is envy-free (EF), if for every i , j ∈N, vi (Ai )≥ vi (A j ).
It iswell known that envy-freeness is a very strict requirement in thepresence of indivisible goods;
e.g., consider any instancewhere all agents have large value for one specific good andnegligible value
for everything else. This fact gives rise to considering relaxations of envy-freeness, with the hope of
obtaining more positive results.
We begin with two such relaxations, and their approximate versions, where an agent may envy
some other agent, but only by an amount dependent on the value of a single item in the other agent’s
bundle. Formally:
Definition 2.2. Let α ∈ [0,1]. An allocationA = (A1, . . . ,An) is an
– α-EF1 (α-envy-free up to one good) allocation, if for every pair of agents i , j ∈ N, with A j 6= ;,
there exists an item g ∈ A j , such that vi (Ai )≥α ·vi (A j \ {g }).
2The implications of Caragiannis et al. [10] apply only to the exact versions of the corresponding notions.
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– α-EFX (α-envy-free up to any good) allocation, if vi (Ai ) ≥ α · vi (A j \ {g }) holds for every pair
i , j ∈N, with A j 6= ;, and for every g ∈ A j with vi (g )> 0.
3
Note that for α = 1 in the above definitions, we obtain precisely the notions of envy-freeness up
to one good (EF1) [9] and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) [10]. The difference between these
two notions is simply the quantifier regarding the item that eliminates envy when removed from an
agent’s bundle. Clearly, EF implies EFX, which in turn implies EF1.
We now move on to a different notion, also proposed by Budish [9]. Motivated by the question
of what we can guarantee in the worst case to the agents, the rationale is to think of a generaliza-
tion of the well-known cut-and-choose protocol to multiple agents: Suppose that agent i is asked
to partition the goods into n bundles and then the rest of the agents choose a bundle before i . In
the worst case, agent i will be left with her least valuable bundle. Hence, a risk-averse agent would
choose a partition that maximizes the minimum value of a bundle in the partition. This gives rise to
the following definition.
Definition 2.3. Given n agents, and a subset S ⊆ M of items, the n-maximin share of agent i with
respect to S is:
µi (n,S)= max
A ∈Πn (S)
min
A j∈A
vi (A j ) .
From the definition, it directly follows that n ·µi (n,S)≤ vi (S). When S =M , this quantity is called
themaximin share of agent i . We say that T ∈Πn(M ) is an n-maximin share defining partition for
agent i , if minT j∈T vi (T j )=µi (n,M ). When it is clear from context what n andM are, we will simply
writeµi instead of µi (n,M ). The solution concept we are interested in, asks for a partition that gives
each agent her (approximate) maximin share.
Definition 2.4. Let α ∈ [0,1]. An allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An ) is called an α-MMS (α-maximin share)
allocation if vi (Ai )≥α ·µi , for every i ∈N.
The last notionwe define is related but not directly comparable toMMS. The idea is that instead of
imagining an agent i partitioning the items inton bundles, we think of i as partitioning the combined
bundle of herself and another agent into two bundles and receiving the one she values less.
Definition2.5. Letα ∈ [0,1]. An allocationA = (A1, . . . ,An) is called anα-PMMS (α-pairwisemaximin
share) allocation if for every pair of agents i , j ∈N,
vi (Ai )≥α · max
(B1,B2)
min{vi (B1),vi (B2)} ,
where (B1,B2) ∈Π2(Ai ∪ A j ).
In Definitions 2.4 and 2.5, when α = 1, we refer to the corresponding allocations as MMS and
PMMS allocations respectively. It has been already observed that the notion of PMMS is stronger than
EFX [10].
Example 1. To illustrate the relevant definitions, let us consider an instance with 3 agents and 5
items:
a b c d e
Agent 1 3 1 1 1 4
Agent 2 4 3 3 1 4
Agent 3 3 2 1 3 4
3The requirement that vi (g ) > 0 in the definition ofα-EFX has been dropped by Plaut and Roughgarden [20] but several
of their results hold under the assumption of all values being strictly positive.
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If M = {a,b,c ,d ,e} is the set of items, one can see that µ1(3,M ) = 3, µ2(3,M ) = 4, µ3(3,M ) = 4.
For example, looking at agent 1, there exists a partition so that the worst bundle is worth a value of 3,
and there is no partition where the worst bundle is better. Similarly, agent 2 can produce a partition
where the worst bundle has a value of 4 for her, and there is no other partition that can guarantee a
better worst-case value.
Let us examine the allocation A = ({e}, {b,c}, {a,d }). Clearly, this is an EF allocation, and hence
it is also an EFX, EF1, MMS, and PMMS allocation. Consider now the allocation B = ({a}, {b,e}, {c ,d }).
This is no longer EF and it is also neither EFX nor PMMS. However, it is an EF1 as well as an MMS
allocation. Clearly, each agent i receives a value of at least µi (3,M ). To see why it is EF1, note that
agents 1 and 3 envy agent 2 but removing item e from the bundle of agent 2 eliminates the envy from
either agent. We can also see that B is a 3
4
-EFX allocation. To verify this, we can look at agent 1, and
compare the value of her bundle to the bundle of agent 2 when we remove either item b or e . Finally,
it is not hard to check that B is also a 3
4
-PMMS allocation.
3 EFX and EF1 Allocations
We begin our exposition with the more direct relaxations of envy-freeness, EF1 and EFX. Within this
section, we always start with either an α-EF1 or α-EFX allocation, for some α ∈ (0,1], and explore the
implications and fairness guarantees that can be derived. We also pay particular attention to the case
of exact EFX or EF1 allocations, i.e., for α= 1.
We already know that EFX is stronger than EF1. Our first warm-up proposition states that this also
holds in an approximation preserving sense. We complement this by the fact that EF1 allocations
cannot provide any approximation to EFX.
Proposition 3.1. For n ≥ 2, any α-EFX allocation is also an α-EF1 allocation for any α ∈ (0,1]. On the
other hand, an EF1 allocation is not necessarily an α-EFX allocation for any α ∈ (0,1].
Proof. Start with an α-EFX allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An). This means that for any i , j ∈ N we have that
vi (Ai )≥α·v j (A j g ), where g ∈ argminh∈A j ,vi (h)>0 vi (h). However this alsomeans that for any i , j ∈N ,
there exists some g ∈ A j , such that vi (Ai )≥α ·v j (A j g ). Thus A is also an α-EF1 allocation.
Now regarding the second part of the statement, consider the following simple example: Suppose
that we have 2 agents and 3 items, g1,g2,g3. The agents have identical values over the items, specif-
ically vi (g1) = V ,vi (g2) = 1 and vi (g3) = α, for i ∈ {1,2}, α ∈ (0,1] and V ≫ 1. We now consider the
allocation A = ({g1,g2}, {g3}). It is easy to see that this is an α-EF1 allocation but also an
1
V
-EFX allo-
cation, and 1
V
can be made arbitrarily small. By adding any number of dummy agents and an equal
number of dummy items, so that g1,g2,g3 have no value for the dummy agents and the j th dummy
item has nonzero value only for the j th dummy agent, this instance can be easily generalized to any
number of agents.
Notice that an equivalent way of stating the EF1 6⇒ α-EFX part of Proposition 3.1 would be: an
α-EF1 allocation is not necessarily a β-EFX allocation for any α,β ∈ (0,1].
Before proving guarantees in terms of MMS and PMMS, we state a useful technical lemma which
generalizes both (the k = 1 case of) Lemma 1 of Bouveret and Lemaître [7] and Lemma 3.4 of Amana-
tidis et al. [2]. In its simplest form, the lemma states that removing any item, together with any agent,
does not decrease the maximin share of the remaining agents. In general, it allows to remove ap-
propriately chosen subsets of items, while reducing the number of agents by 1, so that the maximin
share of a specific agent does not decrease.
Lemma3.2. SupposeT ∈Πn(M ) is an n-maximin share defining partition for agent i , i.e.,µi (n,M )=
minT j∈T vi (T j ). Then, for any set of goods S, such that there exists some j with S ⊆ T j , it holds that
µi (n−1,M S)≥µi (n,M ) .
In particular, for any item g, µi (n−1,M {g })≥µi (n,M ).
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Proof. Let us look at agent i , and consider a partition of M that attains her maximin share. Let T =
(T1, . . . ,Tn) and assume, without loss of generality, that S ⊆ Tn . Consider the remaining partition
(T1, . . . ,Tn−1) enhanced in an arbitrary way by the items of Tn S. This is an (n −1)-partition of M
S, where the value of agent i for any bundle is at least µi (n,M ). Thus, we have µi (n − 1,M S) ≥
µi (n,M ).
Next we study EFX allocations in terms of the MMS guarantees they can provide, starting with the
case of a small number of agents.
Proposition 3.3. For n ∈ {2,3}, an EFX allocation is also a 23 -MMS allocation. Moreover, this guarantee
is tight.
Proof. We prove the statement for n = 2. The proof for the case of three agents is slightly more com-
plex but of similar flavor.
Suppose that we have an EFX allocation A = (A1,A2). We show that for agent 1 we have v1(A1)≥
2
3
µ1(2,M ). The case of agent 2 is symmetric. Since items of no value for agent 1 are completely
irrelevant for her view of both EFX and MMS allocations, we can assume without loss of generality,
that v1(g )> 0 for all g ∈M .
In the sequel, we write µ1 instead of µ1(n,M ). If A2 =;, then clearly v1(A1)= v1(M )≥µ1, so we
may assume |A2| ≥ 1. If |A2| = {g }, then v1(A1) = v1(M {g }) = µ1(1,M {g }) ≥ µ1(2,M ) = µ1, where
the inequality follows from Lemma 3.2. The remaining case is when |A2| ≥ 2. Suppose, towards a
contradiction, that v1(A1)<
2
3µ1. Since A is an EFX allocation, we have that
v1(A2)≤ v1(A1)+v1(g ) , (1)
where g ∈ argminh∈A2 v1(h). Since A2 contains at least two items, we have
v1(g )≤
1
2
v1(A2) . (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we get v1(g ) ≤ v1(A1). Again by (1), this implies that v1(A2) <
4
3µ1. But then,
v1(M )= v1(A1)+v1(A2)<
6
3µ1 = 2µ1, a contradiction, since by definition, we know that vi (M )≥ n ·µi
for every i ∈N .
Regarding tightness, consider the following simple example. Suppose that we have 2 agents and
4 items, a,b,c ,d . The agents have identical values over the items, specifically vi (a) = vi (b) = 2 and
vi (c) = vi (d ) = 1, for i ∈ {1,2}. We now look at the allocation A = ({a,b}, {c ,d }). It is easy to see
that µ1 = µ2 = 3 and that A an EFX allocation. However v2({c ,d }) = 2=
2
3µ2. By adding an arbitrary
number of copies of agent 2 and an equal number of items of value 3, this instance can be generalized
to any number of agents.
Beyond three agents, the picture gets somewhat more complicated. The next result is one of the
main highlights of our work. When moving from the case of n ≤ 3, to a higher number of agents,
the approximation guarantee achieved, in terms of MMS, degrades from 2/3 to a quantity between
4/7= 0.5714 and 0.5914. Surprisingly, the same happens to the MMS guarantee of a PMMS allocation,
as we show in the next section.
It is interesting to note that recently Barman and Krishnamurty [4] obtained a simple 2/3-appro-
ximation algorithm for MMS by showing that when agents agree on the ordering of the values of the
items, then there exists a particular EFX allocation that is also a 2/3-MMS allocation. As indicated by
the proof of the following proposition, this is not true for all EFX allocations, even when the agents
are identical.
Proposition 3.4. For n ≥ 4, any EFX allocation is also a 47 -MMS allocation. On the other hand, an EFX
allocation is not necessarily an α-MMS allocation for α> 813 and, as n grows large, for α> 0.5914.
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Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) be an EFX allocation. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that A is not a
4
7
-MMS allocation, i.e., there exists some j so that v j (A j )<
4
7
µ j (n,M ). Without loss of generality, we
assume that agent 1 is such an agent, and write µ1 instead of µ1(n,M ). Note that we may remove
any agent, other than agent 1, that receives exactly one good, and still end up with an EFX allocation
that is not a 47-MMS allocation. Indeed, if |Ai | = 1 for some i > 1, then (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai+1, . . . ,An) is
an EFX allocation of M Ai to N {i } and, by Lemma 3.2, µ1(n−1,M Ai )≥µ1(n,M ). Thus, v1(A1)<
4
7µ1(n−1,M Ai ). Therefore, again without loss of generality, wemay assume that |Ai | > 1 for all i > 1
in the initial allocation A .
Given A , we say that a bundle A j is bad if j > 1, |A j | = 2, and ming∈A j v1(g ) >
1
2v1(A1). An item
is bad if it belongs to a bad bundle, while a bundle is good if it is not bad. Let B be the set of all bad
items.
It is not hard to show that if Ai is good, then v1(A1) ≥
2
3
v1(Ai ). When i = 1 this is straightfor-
ward; otherwise we consider two cases. First assume that |Ai | = 2. Then, by definition, we have
ming∈Ai v1(g )≤
1
2
v1(A1) and, sinceA is EFX, wehavemaxg∈Ai v1(g )≤ v1(A1). Thus, v1(Ai )≤
3
2
v1(A1).
Next, assume that |Ai | ≥ 3. Then, ming∈Ai v1(g ) ≤
1
3v1(Ai ) and, since A is EFX, we have v1(Ai )−
ming∈Ai v1(g )≤ v1(A1). Thus, we get v1(A1)≥ v1(Ai )−
1
3v1(Ai )=
2
3v1(Ai ).
Nowwe are going to show that v1(A1)≥
4
7µ1(n
′,M ′) for a reduced instance that we get by possibly
removing some of the items of B , i.e., bad items. We do so in a way that ensures that µ1(n
′,M ′)≥µ1,
thus contradicting the choices of A and A1. We consider an n-maximin share defining partition T
for agent 1, i.e., minTi∈T v1(Ti )=µ1. If there is a bundle of T containing two items of B , g1, g2, then
we remove those two items and reduce the number of agents by one. By Lemma 3.2, we have that
µ1(n−1,M {g1,g2})≥µ1. We repeat asmany times as necessary to get a reduced instancewith n
′ ≤n
agents and a set of items M ′ ⊆M for which there is an n′-maximin share defining partition T ′ for
agent 1, such that no bundle contains more than 1 item of B . By repeatedly using Lemma 3.2, we
haveµ1(n
′,M ′)≥µ1.
Let x be the number of items of B in the reduced instance (recall that these items are defined
with respect to A , hence they belong to a bundle of size 2 in A and have value at least 12v1(A1) for
agent 1). Clearly, x cannot be greater than n′, or some bundle of T ′ would contain at least 2 bad
items. Further, if |B | = y , i.e., the number of bad items in the original instance, then we know that the
number of good bundles in A was n−
y
2 , and that the number of agents was reduced
y−x
2 times, i.e.,
n′ =n−
y−x
2 . Hence, we may express the number of good bundles in the original instance in terms of
n′ and x only, as n′− x2 .
Recall that µ1 ≤µ1(n
′,M ′) and, by the definition of maximin share, µ1(n
′,M ′)≤ 1
n′
v1(M
′). Thus
µ1 ≤
1
n′
v1(M
′) . (3)
In order to upper bound v1(M
′), notice that M ′ contains all the items of all the good bundles of A
plus x bad items. As discussed above, the value (with respect to agent 1) of each good bundle is
upper bounded by 32v1(A1). On the other hand, A being EFX implies that maxg∈Ai v1(g )≤ v1(A1) for
any bad bundle Ai . That is, any bad item’s value is upper bounded by v1(A1). So, we have
v1(M
′)≤ x ·v1(A1)+
(
n′−
x
2
−1
) 3
2
v1(A1)+v1(A1)
=
(
3n′
2
+
x
4
−
1
2
)
v1(A1)
≤
(
3n′
2
+
n′
4
−
1
2
)
v1(A1)
=
7n′−2
4
v1(A1) . (4)
We combine inequalities (3) and (4) to get v1(A1)≥
4n′
7n′−2µ1 ≥
4
7µ1, which contradicts the choices
of A and A1.
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This establishes the positive part of the theorem. To see that EFX does not imply anything stronger
than 8
13
-MMS, notice that forn′ = n = 4 the above analysis can be tight. Onone hand, 4n
′
7n′−2
=
8
13
in this
case, while on the other hand the following instance indicates that this is the best one can guarantee
for 4 agents. Suppose that we have 12 items with the following values for agent 1:
v1(gi )=


1/8 1≤ i ≤ 4
1/2 5≤ i ≤ 8
1 9≤ i ≤ 12
It is not hard to see that µ1 = 1+
1
2
+
1
8
=
13
8
in this instance. Now consider the allocation A =
({g1, . . . ,g5}, {g6,g7,g8}, {g9,g10}, {g11,g12}). Assuming that agents 2, 3 and 4 are identical to agent 1,
it is not hard to check that this is an EFX allocation. Yet, v1(A1) = 1 =
8
13µ1. By adding an arbi-
trary number of copies of agent 4 and her bundle, this instance can be generalized to any number of
agents.
The stronger bound for α as n grows large follows by Propositions 4.1 and 4.3.
By following a similar analysis as in the proof of Proposition 3.3, it can be shown that for any
number of agents α-EFX implies at least α2 -MMS. The actual guarantee, moreover, cannot be much
better than this.
Proposition 3.5. For n ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0,1), any α-EFX allocation is also an αnα+2n−2-MMS allocation
but not necessarily a β-MMS allocation, for any β > 2α2+α . For n ≥ 4, the upper bound is improved to
max{ α
1+α
, 8α
11+2α
}.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) be an α-EFX allocation and focus on agent 1. By Lemma 3.2, we may
assume, without loss of generality, that for every i ≥ 2 we have that |Ai | ≥ 2. Thus, for all i ≥ 2, there
exists some gi ∈ argminh∈Ai v1(h) so that v1(A1)≥α(v1(Ai )−v1(gi )) and v1(gi )≤ v1(Ai gi ). Then
v1(Ai )≤
1
α
v1(A1)+v1(gi )≤
1
α
v1(A1)+v1(Ai gi )
≤
1
α
v1(A1)+
1
α
v1(A1)=
2
α
v1(A1) .
So, we have that
nµ1 ≤ v(M )= v(A1)+
∑
i≥2
v(Ai )
≤ v(A1)+
∑
i≥2
2
α
v1(A1)=
α+2(n−1)
α
v1(A1) ,
and finally we can conclude
v1(A1)≥
αn
α+2n−2
µ1 .
Regarding the upper bound, fix any α ∈ (0,1) and suppose that we have 2 agents and 4 items:
a,b,c ,d . The agents have identical valuation functions, in particular vi (a) = vi (b) = 1 and vi (c) =
vi (d )=
α
2 , for i ∈ {1,2}. We now look at the allocation A = ({a,b}, {c ,d }). It is easy to see that this an
α-EFX allocation which, however, is only an 2α2+α-MMS allocation.
For the case of n ≥ 4, consider the following example. We define an instance with n = 4 identical
agents and k +7 items. Let α ∈ (0,1]. For every agent i we have
vi (g j )=


α
k 1≤ j ≤ k
1
2 k +1≤ j ≤ k +3
1 k +4≤ j ≤ k +7
LetA = (A1, . . . ,A4)= ({g1,g2, . . . ,gk}, {gk+1,gk+2,gk+3, }, {gk+4,gk+5}, {gk+6,gk+7}). It is easy to see that
this is anα-EFX allocationwhich is only an α1+α-MMS allocationwhenα<
1
2 , and is only an
8α
11+2α-MMS
allocation when α≥ 12 and k is large.
It is not hard to see that both instances above can be generalized to any number of agents.
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In contrast to EFX, α-EF1 allocations provide a much weaker approximation of maximin shares,
namely a ratio of O
(
1
n
)
for constant α. The following proposition generalizes a result of Caragiannis
et al. [10].4
Proposition 3.6. For n ≥ 2, any α-EF1 allocation is also an αn−1+α-MMS allocation for any α ∈ (0,1],
and this is tight.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) be an α-EF1 allocation and fix some agent i . The case where at least one
of the bundles is empty is straightforward, so wemay assume that the bundles are all non-empty. For
all agents j ∈ N {i }, there exists an item g j ∈ A j such that vi (Ai ) ≥ α(vi (A j )− vi (g j )). By summing
up over N {i } and adding αvi (Ai ) to both sides, we have
(n−1)vi (Ai )+αvi (Ai )≥α
(
vi (Ai )+
∑
j 6=i
vi (A j )−
∑
j 6=i
vi (g j )
)
=α
(
vi (M )−
∑
j 6=i
vi (g j )
)
,
and thus,
vi (Ai )≥
α
(
vi (M )−
∑
j 6=i vi (g j )
)
n−1+α
≥
αµi
n−1+α
.
To see why the last inequality holds, notice that in any n-maximin share defining partition for agent
i , the bundle that does not contain any of the g j s, has value at most vi (M )−
∑
j 6=i vi (g j ); therefore,
µi is also upper bounded by this quantity.
Regarding tightness, consider the following example. We have an instance with n ≥ 2 identical
agents and 3n−2 items. Let α ∈ (0,1) and V ≫ 1. For every agent i we have
vi (g j )=


α j = 1 or j = 3k −1, 1≤ k ≤ n−1
1−α j = 3k , 1≤ k ≤ n−1
V j = 3k +1, 1≤ k ≤ n−1
Now consider A = (A1, . . . ,An)= ({g1}, {g2,g3,g4}, {g5,g6,g7}, . . . , {g3n−4,g3n−3,g3n−2}). It is easy to see
that this is an α-EF1 allocation which is, however, only an αn−1+α-MMS allocation.
Finally, we investigate the implications that can be derived for EFX and EF1 allocations, in terms
of PMMS guarantees. Despite Proposition 3.1 suggesting that (approximate) EF1 is much weaker than
(approximate) EFX, the two notions give comparable guarantees with respect to PMMS. In particular,
the guarantee implied by α-EFX can be at most 4/3 times the guarantee implied by α-EF1.
Proposition 3.7. For n ≥ 2, any α-EFX allocation is also a 2α
2+α
-PMMS allocation for any α ∈ (0,1], and
this is tight.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) be an α-EFX allocation and consider agents i and j . We focus on agent
i . Notice that when |A j | = 1 we have vi (Ai ) ≥ µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) by the definition of maximin share;
so assume that |A j | ≥ 2. If g ∈ argminh∈A j vi (h), then we have vi (Ai ) ≥ α(vi (A j )− vi (g )) but also
vi (g )≤ 0.5vi (A j ). Combining these two inequalities we get vi (Ai )≥
α
2
vi (A j ). Thus
2µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )≤ vi (Ai ∪ A j )= vi (Ai )+vi (A j )≤
2+α
α
vi (Ai ) ,
which directly implies
vi (Ai )≥
2α
2+α
µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) .
Regarding tightness, consider the following example: We have an instance with n ≥ 2 identical
agents and 2n items. Let α ∈ (0,1]. For every agent i we have
vi (g j )=
{ α
2 j = 1,2
1 3≤ j ≤ 2n
4The bound by Caragiannis et al. [10] is for α= 1 and for allocations that are both EF1 and Pareto optimal. It follows by
their proof, however, that it holds even when Pareto optimality is dropped.
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Now consider A = (A1, . . . ,An)= ({g1,g2}, {g3,g4, }, {g5,g6}, . . . , {g2n−1,g2n}). It is easy to see that this is
an α-EFX allocation which is also an 2α
2+α
-PMMS allocation.
Proposition 3.8. For n ≥ 3, anyα-EF1 allocation is also an α1+α-PMMS allocation for anyα ∈ (0,1], and
this is tight.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . ,An) be an α-EF1 allocation and consider agents i , j . We focus on agent i and
we assume that g is an item in A j so that vi (Ai )≥α(vi (A j )−vi (g )). We split the proof into two cases:
Case 1: If vi (g )> vi ((Ai ∪A j ) {g }), then ({g }, (Ai ∪A j ) {g }) is a 2-maximin share defining partition for
agent i . That is, µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )= vi (Ai )+ vi (A j )− vi (g ). Therefore, µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )≤ vi (Ai )+
1
αvi (Ai ),
or equivalently, vi (Ai )≥
α
1+αµi (2,Ai ∪ A j ).
Case 2: If vi (g )≤ vi ((Ai ∪ A j ) {g }), then
2µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )≤ vi (Ai ∪ A j )= vi (Ai )+vi (A j {g })+vi (g )
≤ 2vi (Ai )+2vi (A j {g })≤
(
2+
2
α
)
vi (Ai ) ,
or equivalently, vi (Ai )≥
α
1+αµi (2,Ai ∪ A j ).
Regarding tightness, consider the following example: We have an instance with n ≥ 3 agents and
n+1 items. Let α ∈ (0,1) andV ≫ 1+α. We focus on agent i and we have
v1(g j )=


α j = 1 or 4≤ j ≤ n+1
1 j = 2
V j = 3
Now consider A = (A1, . . . ,An) = ({g1}, {g2,g3}, {g5}, . . . , {gn+4}) and assume that agents 2 ≤ i ≤ n are
not envious. It is easy to see that accoriding to agent 1, this is an α-EF1 allocation which is also an
α
1+α-PMMS allocation.
Algorithmic Implications for PMMS. The last two propositions also have further consequences.
First of all, it is known that for additive valuations, EF1 allocations can be computed efficiently by a
simple round-robin algorithm [16, 10]. Hence Proposition 3.8 yields a 1/2-PMMS allocation in poly-
nomial time. Moreover, exact EFX allocations can be computed efficientlywhen agents have the same
ordering on the values of the goods [4, 20], i.e., when all agents have the same ordinal preferences (but
possibly different cardinal values). This implies a 2/3-approximation by Proposition 3.7. These facts
are summarized below.
Corollary 3.9. For n ≥ 3,
(1) the round-robin algorithm, where each agent picks in her turn her favorite available item, pro-
duces a 12 -PMMS allocation.
(2) we can compute in polynomial time a 2
3
-PMMS allocation when all agents agree on the ordering
of the goods with respect to their value.
It is an interesting open problem to compute a better than 1/2-PMMS allocation for additive val-
uations. So far, the existence of 0.618-PMMS allocations has been established but without an efficient
algorithm [10].
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4 PMMS andMMS Allocations
We now explore analogous questions with Section 3, but starting now with (approximate) MMS or
PMMS allocations. We begin with the guarantees that PMMS allocations imply for MMS and vice versa.
In order to proceed, we will make use of the following observation, that PMMS implies EFX.
Proposition 4.1 (Caragiannis et al. [10]). For n ≥ 2, any PMMS allocation is also an EFX allocation.
For two agents, it is clear by their definition that the notions of MMS and PMMS are identical. For
more agents, by Propositions 3.3, 3.4 and 4.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. For n = 3, a PMMS allocation is also a 23 -MMS allocation. Moreover, for n ≥ 4, a PMMS
allocation is also a 47-MMS allocation.
Moreover, the guarantees of Corollary 4.2 are tight for a small number of agents and almost tight
for bigger instances.
Proposition 4.3. For n ≥ 3, a PMMS allocation is not necessarily an α-MMS allocation for α > 23 and,
as n grows large, for α≥ 0.5914.
Proof. Suppose that we have the following instance with 3 agents and 6 items. The items have the
following values for agent 1:
v1(gi )=
{
1/2 1≤ i ≤ 3
1 4≤ i ≤ 6
Clearly, µ1 =
3
2 . Consider the allocation A = ({g4}, {g1,g2,g3}, {g5,g6}). Assuming that agents 2 and 3
have large value for their bundles and negligible value for everything else, it is easy to check that A
is a PMMS allocation. However, v1(A1)= 1=
2
3
µ1. By adding an arbitrary number of copies of agent 3
and her bundle, this instance can be generalized to any number of agents.
Next, we show a stronger bound as n grows large. The construction below achieves the desired
bound for n ≥ 3 ·7 ·43 ·1806 = 1,631,721. However, there is a smooth transition from 2/3 to that; e.g.,
already for n ≥ 21 we get a bound of 3/5, which worsens as n increases. We are going to consider
the suggested allocation from the viewpoint of agent 1, while assuming that agents 2 through n have
large value for their bundles and negligible value for everything else. Since there is a large number of
items, we are not going to define v1(·) explicitly, but implicitly through the different types of bundles
the agents get. So consider the allocation A where:
– agent 1 receives 1 item of value 1,
–
⌊
n
3
⌋
agents receive 3 items of value 12 each,
–
⌊
n
7
⌋
agents receive 7 items of value 16 each,
–
⌊
n
43
⌋
agents receive 43 items of value 1
42
each,
–
⌊
n
1807
⌋
agents receive 1807 items of value 1
1806
each,
– the remaining (at least n−12 ) agents receive 2 items of value 1 each.
It is easy to see thatA is EFX. Whatmay not be obvious is that the number of agents receiving 2 items
is at least n−1
2
. However, it is amatter of simple calculations to check that
(⌊
n
3
⌋
+
⌊
n
7
⌋
+
⌊
n
43
⌋
+
⌊
n
1807
⌋)
+
1 ≤ n+1
2
for n ≥ 3. We show now how to get the bound for n = 1,631,721 (in which case the agents
receiving 2 items are exactly n−12 ). Then, this instance can be generalized to any number of agents by
just adding more agents who receive 2 items of value 1 each.
Calculating nowµ1 is straightforward: in an n-maximin share defining partition for agent 1, each
agent would receive exactly one item of each type. That is, µ1 = 1+
1
2 +
1
6 +
1
42 +
1
1806 , and v1(A1)= 1<
0.5914 ·µ1.
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We continue with the worst-case guarantee we can get for MMS by an α-PMMS allocation, with
α< 1. Notice that now the guarantee degrades with n.
Proposition 4.4. For n ≥ 3 and α ∈ (0,1), any α-PMMS allocation is also an α
2(n−1)−α(n−2)
-MMS alloca-
tion but not necessarily a β-MMS allocation, for any β> α
n−1−α(n−2)
.
Proof. The positive result is a direct corollary of Propositions 4.6 and 3.6.
For the upper bound, suppose that we have n ≥ 3 agents and 2n−1 items. We focus on agent 1
and her values
v1(g j )=


α j = 1
1−α j = 2k , 1≤ k ≤ n−1
V j = 2k +1, 1≤ k ≤ n−1
where α ∈ (0,1) and V ≫ 1. Now consider A = (A1, . . . ,A4)= ({g1}, {g2,g3}, {g4,g5}, . . . , {g2n−2,g2n−1, }).
That is, every agent i > 1 gets one item of value 1−α and one item of valueV . It is easy to see that this
is an α-PMMS allocation, given that all agents, other than agent 1, have large value for their bundles
and negligible value for everything else. However, µ1(n,M )=α+ (n−1)(1−α) =n−1−α(n−2), and
therefore A ia only an α
n−1−α(n−2)
-MMS allocation.
The next result exhibits a sharp contrast between PMMS and MMS. Although PMMS allocations
(exact or approximate) imply some MMS guarantee, even exact MMS allocations do not imply any
approximation with respect to PMMS.
Proposition 4.5. For n ≥ 3, an α-MMS allocation is not necessarily a β-PMMS allocation for any α,β ∈
(0,1].
Proof. It suffices to prove the proposition forα= 1. Consider an instancewith n ≥ 3 agents and 2n−2
items. We focus on agent 1 and her values
v1(g j )=


ǫ j = 1
1 2≤ j ≤n
0 n+1≤ j ≤ 2n−2
where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small. That is, agent 1 views n −1 items as “large”, 1 item as “very small”,
and everything else as “worthless”. As a consequence µ1(n,M ) = ǫ. Now consider the allocation
A = (A1, . . . ,An)= ({g1}, {g2, . . . ,gn}, {gn+1}, . . . , {g2n−2}) and assume any agent i 6= 1 has large value for
her bundle and negligible value for everything else. It is easy to see that A is an MMS allocation.
However µ1(2,A1∪ A2)≥
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
≥ 1 and thus this is only a γ-PMMS allocation for γ≤ ǫ.
We conclude this section by discussing the guarantees of MMS and PMMS with respect to EF1 and
EFX. Even for EF1, we see that MMS and PMMS differ significantly in what they can achieve.
Proposition 4.6. For n ≥ 2, an α-PMMS allocation is also an α
2−α
-EF1 allocation for any α ∈ (0,1), and
this is tight.
Proof. LetA = (A1, . . . ,An) be anα-PMMS allocation. Consider agents i , j and let vi (Ai )=γµi (2,Ai ∪
A j ) for some γ ≥ α. We focus on agent i , so, without loss of generality, we may assume that there is
no item h such that vi (h)= 0. Notice that when |A j | ≤ 1, either there is nothing to check or we need
to check that agent i does not envy the empty bundle (which is, of course, true). So, we assume that
|A j | ≥ 2. Also, we may assume that γ ≤ 1, or else vi (A j ) < µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) and agent i does not envy
agent j anyway. Suppose that g ∈ argmaxh∈A j vi (h) and consider the following two cases:
Case 1: vi (g ) ≥ µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ). Notice that by the definition of µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ), we must have that
µi (2,Ai ∪A j )= vi (Ai )+vi (A j )−vi (g ). Thus, vi (A j )−vi (g )=µi (2,Ai ∪A j )−vi (Ai )= (1−γ)µi (2,Ai ∪
A j ). If γ= 1 then clearly vi (Ai )≥ vi (A j )−vi (g )= 0. Otherwise, we have
vi (Ai )=γµi (2,Ai ∪ A j )=
γ
1−γ
(vi (A j )−vi (g ))≥
α
1−α
(vi (A j )−vi (g )) .
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Case 2: vi (g )=β<µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ). Initially we prove that vi (A j )≤β+2µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )−γµi (2,Ai ∪ A j ).
Suppose for a contradiction that vi (A j )>β+2µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )−γµi (2,Ai ∪ A j ).
Now we sort the items in A j in an increasing order according to their value regarding agent i ,
say h1,h2, . . . ,hk = g . Start with set Ai and add items from set A j , one at a time, until the value
exceedsµi (2,Ai ∪A j ), i.e., find an index l such that vi (Ai ∪{h1,h2, . . . ,hl })>µi (2,Ai ∪A j ) but vi (Ai ∪
{h1,h2, . . . ,hl−1})≤µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) (slightly abusing notation here, {h1, . . . ,hl−1} denotes the empty set
when l = 1). Let S = Ai ∪ {h1,h2, . . . ,hl }. Since vi (S {hl }) ≤ µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) and vi (hl ) ≤ vi (g ) = β we
have that vi (S)≤µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )+β and thus vi ({h1,h2, . . . ,hl })≤µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )+β−vi (Ai ). Therefore
vi (A j S)= vi (A j )−vi ({h1,h2, . . . ,hl })≥ vi (A j )−µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )−β+vi (Ai )
> 2µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )+β−γµi (2,Ai ∪ A j )−µi (2,Ai ∪ A j )−β+vi (Ai )
=µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) .
This means that in the partition (S,A j S) both sets are strictly better than µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ) for agent i ;
this contradicts the definition of µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ).
So itmust be the casewhere vi (A j )≤β+2µi (2,Ai∪A j )−γµi (2,Ai∪A j ). Therefore vi (A j )−vi (g )=
vi (A j )−β≤ (2−γ)µi (2,Ai ∪ A j ), and so
vi (Ai )=γµi (2,Ai ∪ A j )≥
γ
2−γ
(vi (A j )−vi (g ))≥
α
2−α
(vi (A j )−vi (g )) .
We conclude that an α-PMMS allocation leads to an α
2−α
-EF1 allocation since α
2−α
≤ α
1−α
for any
α ∈ (0,1).
Regarding tightness, consider the following example: We have an instance with n = 2 agents and
2k +1≥ 5 items. Let α ∈ (0,1). We focus on agent 1 and we have
v1(g j )=


α
k
1≤ j ≤ k
2−α
k k +1≤ j ≤ 2k
ǫ j = 2k +1
where ǫ is an arbitrarily small positive amount. Now consider A = (A1, . . . ,An) = ({g1, . . . ,gk }, {gk+1,
. . . ,g2k+1}) and assume that agents 2 is not envious. It is easy to see that accoriding to agent 1, this
is an α-PMMS allocation which is also however, only an α2−α-EF1 allocation. It is straightforward to
generalize this instance to any number of agents.
Proposition 4.7. For n ≥ 3, an α-MMS allocation is not necessarily a β-EF1 allocation for any α,β ∈
(0,1].
Proof. Wemay use the same example as in Proposition 4.5. Like before, A is an MMS allocation but
only a γ-EF1 allocation for γ≤ ǫ. To see this, notice that v1(A2 {g })= n−2≥ 1 for any g ∈ A2.
When one focuses on guarantees in terms of EFX, there are only negative results. In fact, it is rather
surprising that even though PMMS implies EFX, an α-PMMS allocation with α< 1 does not imply any
approximation in terms of EFX.
Proposition 4.8. For n ≥ 2, an α-PMMS allocation is not necessarily a β-EFX allocation for any α,β ∈
(0,1).
Proof. Consider an instance with n ≥ 2 identical agents and n + 1 items. Let α ∈ (0,1) and V ≫
max{1, 1α −1}. For every agent i we have
vi (g j )=


V j = 1
1
α −1 j = 2
1 3≤ i ≤ n+1
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We examine the allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An)= ({g1,g2}, {g3}, {g4}, . . . , {gn+1}). For any i 6= 1, we focus on
agents i and 1 from i ’s viewpoint. It is easy to see that µi (2,A1∪ Ai )=
1
α
−1+1= 1
α
. Since vi (Ai )= 1,
we get vi (Ai ) = αµi (2,A1 ∪ Ai ). As it is straightforward to see that for any other pair of agents that
there is no envy, we have that A is an α-PMMS allocation. On the other hand, every agent i ∈ N {1}
envies agent 1 up to any item by a factor γ = 1V which can become arbitrarily small for sufficiently
large V .
By Propositions 4.8, 4.7, and 3.1, we also have the corresponding result for approximate MMS
allocations.
Corollary 4.9. For n ≥ 2, anα-MMS allocation is not necessarily a β-EFX allocation for anyα,β ∈ (0,1).
5 Discussion
Themain purpose of this work is to provide a deeper understanding of the connections between the
exact and the approximate versions of four prominent fairness notions used in discretemodels of fair
division. In most cases we give tight, or almost tight, results, providing therefore a close to complete
picture on the status of these questions. Some of our findings also strike as counter-intuitive, given
what was known for the exact versions of these notions.
A direct implication of our results is the non-existence of truthful allocation mechanisms for two
agents that achieve any constant approximation of PMMS EFX, or even EF1. This follows from the
corresponding negative result of Amanatidis et al. [1] for MMS and Propositions 3.5, 3.6, and 4.4. We
defer a more detailed discussion on this to the full version of the paper.
Aside from the questions raised here, there is an abundance of interesting open problems for
future research. Deciding the existence of exact EFX or exact PMMS allocations seem to be two of
the most puzzling such problems. Furthermore, obtaining (algorithmically or existentially) alloca-
tions with better approximation ratios is another class of equally intriguing problems. So far, we
know there exist allocations with ratios of 0.75, 0.618, and 0.5, for MMS, PMMS, and EFX respectively,
out of which, the result for PMMS is existential; our Corollary 3.9 only yields a 0.5-approximation in
polynomial-time. Finally, the combination of fairness with other desired objectives, like Pareto opti-
mality, creates further algorithmic challenges, even for the seemingly easier notion of EF1 [5].
Interestingly enough, our results suggest that improving the current state of the art in the approx-
imation of one of these notions does not imply an immediate improvement on the best approxima-
tion ratio for the others, with the notable exception ofα-EFX. An algorithmic result withα> 2/3 or an
existential result with α> 0.895 for α-EFX would imply an improved algorithmic or existential result
for β-PMMS.
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